Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent non-cooperative game.
INTRODUCTION
remote from the contract path, increases. The nodal pricing approach sets prices based on the marginal cost of generation or of meeting an extra unit of demand at each node on the network, assuming an optimal dispatch. Transmission charges are defined as the cost of moving power between each location and a "swing bus". These charges will generally be insufficient to meet the total cost of the transmission network (Pérez-Arriaga et. al. [8] ), and some additional "common costs" must be recovered.
When considering cross-border transmission, cost recovery becomes more complicated.
Nodal pricing based on marginal costs from an optimal dispatch is unlikely to be implementable, although the right to use a congested cross-border interconnector is sometimes auctioned. We still need to recover the common costs of these interconnectors (over and above any auction revenues), and the costs of any system reinforcement within a country needed to accept the flows from the interconnector. The easy option is simply to recover the costs incurred by each country from electricity charges within that country. This may not be equitable, particularly for countries with a high proportion of transit flows.
The main problem in designing a system that allocates transmission costs on an international basis is assigning responsibility for the power flows, and Bialek [2] suggested a tracing-based methodology that does just this. The underlying assumption is that the flow of power in the network can be represented by a directed graph in which the flows mix proportionally at every node. Then the costs of loop flows could be allocated to the agents causing them. It would also allow transit charges to be related to the costs involved in each route. Bialek [3] applies this to cross-border flows.
The detailed design of tariffs applying the tracing principle is not the focus of this paper.
Instead, we wish to illustrate its theoretical link to the Shapley value, a well-known solution concept in cost allocation problems. In the next section we introduce tracing. Section 3 discusses the gametheoretic justification for the tracing methodology. Section 4 concludes.
THE TRACING METHODOLOGY

The principle
Conventional wisdom is that it is impossible to trace the flow of power from individual generators to individual loads in meshed transmission networks. Assuming, however, that at any network node the inflows are distributed proportionally between the outflows, it is possible -by following the acyclic directed graph of flows in the network -to trace how real and reactive power flows in the network from individual sources to individual sinks. Transmission charges can then be calculated as in the traditional contract path approach but with the fundamental difference that the paths are not arbitrary. A tracing-based method overcomes problems related to charging based on marginal principles, while providing better signals than the postage stamp or contract path methods (Bialek [2] ).
[ . Nodes j and k (respectively, m and l) can be either some other nodes in the system or local generators (local demands) supplying (supplied from) node i. With no additional information, a logical assumption about how inflowing power is distributed among outflows, is that the network node is a perfect "mixer" of incoming flows so that nodal inflows are shared proportionally between the outflows. This implies:
• q i-m is assumed to consist of two components: The proportional sharing principle can be extended to all the network nodes as shown in the next section.
Using the Tracing-based Methodology to Allocate Transmission Charges
Tracing can be conducted either by graph-search algorithm (Kirschen et al [6] ) or by solving linear equations (Bialek [2] ). Here we present the latter as it deals easily with circular flows, which create cycles in the digraph of flows and prevent the use of the graph-search algorithm (Bialek [3] ).
As a simplification, losses have been neglected but they can be easily included.
We start by assigning power flows to individual generators. The total power flow through a node (sum of nodal inflows or outflows) can be expressed, when looking at the inflows, as: 
where α i d is the set of downstream nodes supplied directly from node i (that is power flows from those nodes to node i in the relevant lines) and n is the number of nodes in the system.
The above equation effectively breaks down line flow q i-l into components due to individual generations q Gk . Hence, it can be used to assign responsibility for using the line among all the generators in the system. The total cost can be obtained by summing up all the shares.
For the cost allocation to the loads, it can be shown in a similar way, (Bialek [2] ), that [ ]
where q Lk is load demand at node k and A d is a downstream distribution matrix defined as:
Eq. (6) breaks down the line flow into components due to individual loads and hence it could be used to assign responsibility for costs incurred. Kattuman et.al. [5] discusses how charges could be set in this way.
In the next section, we argue that the cost allocation stemming from tracing is equivalent to that produced by the Shapley value of a co-operative game, and that tracing is therefore an appropriate way of allocating costs.
GAME THEORETIC RATIONALE OF TRACING
Cost Allocation Games
The problem is one of dividing the cost of a jointly used facility among participants in a cooperative venture. If we consider the allocation among exporters, i = 1, 2, ..., n who use the transmission grid to supply their generated power, q i , to importers, the objective is to divide up the The natural framework for the study of cost allocation problems is game theory (Young [10] ).
Willing co-operation in the joint enterprise is the essence of cost sharing, and this is the focus of the theory of co-operative games, which provide a method for exact allocation of joint costs (or benefits)
with fair treatment of the parties. The solution concept used below is due to Shapley [9] , and the essential idea is that co-operative participation requires that each player is allocated what she can gain for herself, through membership in all possible coalitions of the set of players. The Shapley value solution concept has been used in a number of cost allocation models, for example, Littlechild and
Owen [7] .
Game theoretic formulations define the game in terms of players, strategies and coalitions. In standard formulations, players exercise real choices in terms of strategies or coalitions. The game we define is an artificial game, intended to explain the logical justification for the proportional sharing principle. It is constructed to show that in a transmission loss allocation context, the proportional sharing assumption leads to a cost allocation solution that satisfies all the desirable properties one would look for in a solution.
The Game
A general cost allocation game is fully specified in terms of the (finite) set of participants or players, N:={1,2, ..., n}, their demands to supply through the grid, represented by the vector q:=(q 1 , q 2 ,…, q n ) and c = c(q 1 , q 2 ,…, q n ), the cost function (here the transmission costs) or the characteristic function. This is the data of the allocation problem.
Players
The context of transmission cost allocation is that of a fixed number of exporters supplying a set of lines. The levies to recover transmission costs must ultimately fall on exporters, and it is natural to think of N as the set of exporters. However, transmission costs arise for the flow of power, and it is more useful to identify the set of players as the set of units of power (e.g., MWs) flowing through the network. The cost allocation suggested by the equilibrium of this co-operative game would specify a levy for each player; i.e., each unit of power. The allocation of each generator can be obtained by adding up the levies upon the units of power generated by it. In the general cost allocation context, the characteristic function, c, specifies the minimal cost that will be incurred by each coalition of players arranging matters to suit its members. The notion of a coalition requires some interpretation to fit this context.
Coalitions
Coalitions capture the essential strategic element in co-operative games. Rational players may be expected to take advantage of possibilities of coalition formation. For example, in a stable equilibrium each participant will have compared any proposed allocation with what it is able to get by "working alone" to the extent that is possible. Further, any group of players who find that they can do better for themselves by co-operating only among themselves and excluding others from their arrangement, could form a coalition and hold out for their worth, in the formation of any other coalition. The equilibrium must respect all prospects of such coalition formation. It follows that the "worth" of any player, the share the player can be expected to get in the game as a whole, must be related to her worth to all possible coalitions. In the canonical formulation, each subset of {1, ..., R} is a potential coalition; there are 2 R coalitions. The characteristic function, c, attaches a real number, denoting the minimal cost that will be incurred by it, to each one of 2 R coalitions possible. If an allocation is such that none of all possible coalitions can do better for themselves, it is a good candidate for the equilibrium of the game. Such allocations are said to be in the core of the game, and denote solutions acceptable to all players. This general notion of the coalition can be interpreted to fit the problem of transmission loss allocation, as follows.
Shapley Value
Consider first the network segment with only one outflow line, as in Figure 2 . How is the loss [ Figure 2 about here]
We can proceed by constructing a co-operative game using the above framework. Let π denote one permutation of the set {1, ..., R}, with the players accounted as flowing out in the sequence π(1), π (2), ..., π(R). Each i ∈ {1, ..., R}, can be thought of as determining its worth relative to permutation π, based on the incremental cost when the accounting is done according to this order.
The incremental, or marginal cost vector relating to permutation π is given by:
where P(.) denotes the set of "predecessors" of i with respect to π, ( )
Incremental cost is increasing in |P|, the number of predecessors:
Obviously, i places highest value on that permutation where it is the first to be "accounted" to flow out, leaving it with the smallest incremental transmission loss allocation. It is obvious that with this allocation to each individual MW, the total cost would not be covered; this is not a feasible allocation.
One exact loss allocation rule is immediate. Each MW could be charged with the incremental transmission loss when it joins its "predecessors" (from an accounting point of view) in the outflow line. This serial cost-sharing rule recovers actual cost exactly. With a convex cost function, the incremental loss attached to a MW will be higher, the larger the number of its predecessors in the outflow. The cost recovery rule has the efficiency inducing marginal principle built into it, albeit in an unfair way: the charge depends critically on the order in which players are considered to enter the line, and this is based on the arbitrary labelling procedure. Can this procedure be modified to ensure fair treatment to all players? Denote the set of all possible permutations of {1, ..., R} by ΠR . Each π ∈ ΠR can be considered a coalition. This equivalence, in the context of this game, is based on the power of each coalition S ⊂ {1, ..., R} to orchestrate a permutation π only to the extent that members of S are permuted. For each coalition S ∈ 2 R , the cost c(S) of S is defined to be the minimum of the sum of the allocations of all the players in S, taken over all the permutations that can be orchestrated by S. 
When permutations are interpreted as coalitions, the Shapley value allocation is the average, taken over all permutations, of the marginal vectors of the game: , that she could be potentially charged with. Each ordering gets the same weight 1/n!; and the allocation for each MW is the average over n! potential contributions to loss; the average over all possible marginal costs that can be attributed to it, the average cost per MW. This is the same for all players in this game.
The Shapley value is a suitable solution concept because it satisfies all the desirable properties we demand of a cost allocation rule. It lies in the core of the game; i.e., no coalition can do better, and so the allocation will be acceptable to all players. It is symmetric and fair, and also monotonic and additive. The monotonicity property guarantees that the charges will be non-negative, and the system will not lead to any player subsidising another. The additivity property is useful if we were considering other types of charges, such as use of system charges, added on to transmission charges. It guarantees that if charges were decomposable into components, then the order in which the component-wise allocation is done will not make a difference to the cost allocation.
The power flow in the line, and the associated transmission cost, is attributable only on the basis of the total number of units of power flowing through the line, and not on their provenance.
Under this solution concept, in the face of any symmetric cost function, fairness demands equal treatment of each MW, regardless of provenance. The transmission cost allocated to each MW of power flowing in the line is the same. Thus the loss allocation for each generator that supplies a single outflow line is proportional to the share of its generated output in that line. Proportional sharing follows directly from accepting the Shapley value as the solution concept.
Allocation of inflows to out flows
This logic also applies if there were more than one outflow line (for example, the network segment shown in Figure 1 ). From an accounting point of view, one may consider the outflow from the node to the different lines to be toted up, MW by MW, in some order, for example, in the order in which the units of power have been labelled, 1 through R. Given the accounting procedure, the Shapley value allocation is based on equal consideration of all possible permutations of the set {1, ..., R}. If each π ∈Π R has the same probability (1/R!), this implies that each MW has equal probability of being allocated to any of the outflow lines. In other words, the proportional sharing rule is implicit in the determination of the Shapley value of this cost allocation game. Cost allocation over the whole network follows additively from cost allocation in each of the lines in the network. Thus the proportional sharing rule extends to the entire game. Further, the assumption that the set of players is a finite set -of units of power (e.g. MW) -can be relaxed. If player size goes to zero, the non-trivial generalization of the Shapley value to atomic games by Aumann and Shapley [1] preserves the validity of the proportional sharing principle.
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the assumptions underlying a methodology for transmission pricing in a meshed network. We have argued elsewhere [5] that this methodology could be particularly applicable to recovering the common costs of inter-system trades; that is, those that are not recovered by marginal cost pricing schemes. The method establishes paths of real and reactive power flows from individual sources to individual sinks -following the directed graph of flows in the network. The implicit assumption is that, at any network node, the incoming flows are proportionally distributed among the outgoing flows. The aim of this paper was to critically examine this assumption, which can be neither proved nor disproved physically. We rationalized the principle using co-operative game theory, and showed that the Shapley value, the solution concept that has all the desirable properties one may demand of a cost allocation scheme, justifies the proportional sharing rule. 
